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Abstract
The information age environment requires that firms implement strategic performance
measurement systems that focus on intangible assets. These systems are now widely
used and implemented in the public sector. However, there have been few studies on the
relationship between performance measures. Contingent factors and the management
environment of the public sector are fundamentally different from the private sector.
Consequently, performance measurement systems should be adapted before they are
applied to the public sector. Using the data for 13 Korean public enterprises from 1990 to
2003, this study investigates the relation between performance measures. Our findings
suggest that management measures are not significantly associated with goal achievement
measures prospectively. Furthermore, specific management measures are not significantly
related with goal achievement measures either currently or prospectively. Overall, the
results indicate that performance measurement systems in Korean public enterprises
have not been implemented effectively and are not fulfilling the system designers’ original
intention.
Keywords: Korean Public Enterprise, Performance Measurement System, Goal Achievement
Measure, Management Measure
Introduction
Strategic performance measurement systems are widely used in many companies.
Unlike traditional performance measurement systems, strategic performance
measurement systems focus less on financial indicators and more on nonfinancial
67
ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING JOURNAL, VOLUME 1 ISSUE 1, 2006
68
indicators. This is because firms that are faced with changing environments are
increasingly focusing on intangible assets rather than tangible assets with their
management practices. The Mckinsey Company. reported that 75 percent of
firm value was created by intangible assets in 2002 compared to 30 percent in
1982. Nonfinancial measures are also better indicators of financial performance
than accounting and financial measures (Banker et al., 2000). Nonfinancial
measures focus on the value drivers of future financial performance1 and are
aligned to financial measures based on cause-and-effect relations (Hauser et al.
1994).
Strategic performance measurement systems are also increasingly being used
and implemented in the public sector. The topic of accountability and performance
measurement has become more urgent for non-profit organizations as they
encounter increasing competition from a proliferating number of agencies, all
competing for scarce donor, foundation, and government funding (Niven 2003).
For a private sector company, financial measures provide the accountability measure
between it and its owners, the shareholders. For a non-profit, however, the agency’s
mission represents the accountability between it and society (Kaplan 2001).
Therefore, performance measurement systems for the public sector are different
from those for the private sector. In the private sector, systems focus on causal
relationships between financial measures and non-financial measures. In contrast,
systems in the public sector focus on causal relationships between goal achievement
measures (lagging measures) which evaluate the effort for achieving current
mission and management measures (leading measures) which evaluate current
effort for achieving future mission.
However, for all the increasing use of strategic performance measurement systems
in both the private and public sectors, there have been very few studies on the
relation between performance measures - non-financial measures and financial
measures in the private sector (Ittner and Larcker 1998a) and goal achievement
measures and management measures in the public sector. Especially, studies in
the public sector are less common than those in the private sector. There are
several reasons for this. First, non-profit organizations lack the simple elegance
of a financial measure used by for profit organizations to assess their performance
(Kaplan 2001; Forbes 1998). Second, there cannot be one universal model of
organizational effectiveness (Kaplan 2001; Cameron and Whitten 1983) and third,
the existence of multiple constituencies requires other kinds of methodological
approaches for public enterprises (Kaplan 2001; Kanter and Summers 1987).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between goal achievement
measures and management measures in the public sector. The characteristics of
this study are twofold. First, this study follows the structure of a performance
measurement system which is made by agreement between the rater and the
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rate. We adopt the classification for leading measures and lagging measures as
the system represents. This methodology reflects the original intention of the
performance measurement system and avoid the intervention of subjectivity caused
by an investigator’s reclassification of measures. Second, this study uses 14 years
of public data and objectively investigates the long-term relation between the
performance measures. A limitation of prior studies for performance measurement
systems in the public sector is that they use short-term data. This study addresses
that problem.
Using panel data covering the period 1990 to 2003 from the Korean public enterprises’
performance measurement systems, the results indicate that management measures
are not significantly associated with goal achievement measures prospectively. The
results also indicate that the specific management measures which belong to the
following: the organization and human resource management sector (ORG), the
payments and employee relation management sector (EMP), the internal performance
evaluation management sector (PER), the finance and budgeting management sector
(FIN), the research and development sector (R&D), and the planning execution
and internal process management sector (PRO), are not significantly associated
with goal achievement measures currently or prospectively. In sensitivity analysis,
this study reclassifies performance measures into qualitative measures and
quantitative measures. There is no statistically significant relation between qualitative
measures and quantitative measures. These results are consistent both in service
public enterprises and in manufacturing public enterprises. Lastly, the size of the
corporations and the structure of the evaluation methods are significantly associated
with goal achievement measures and quantitative measures. However, the size of
the corporations is not associated with qualitative measures. The number of measures
is not related with goal achievement and quantitative measures, but is related to
qualitative measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the
research sites are described. In the third section, we discuss the relevant literature
and develop the testable hypotheses. In the fourth section, we describe the sample
and empirical tests. The results of the empirical tests and sensitivity analysis are
contained in the fifth section, and the sixth section includes the summary and
conclusion of the study.
The Research Sites
The Outline of the Performance Measurement System of Korean
Public Enterprises
The performance measurement system of Korean public enterprises is a series
of processes which consist of evaluating the yearly performance of each enterprise
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and reflecting the results into incentive schemes and next year’s performance
target according to “The law for management of Korean Public Enterprises”
(Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 24). Korean public enterprises for
which the performance measurement system is applied to enterprise which financed
over 50 percent of their capital from the government. The purpose of this system
which was implemented since 1984 is to allow the entities autonomy and flexibility
in their management and to establish self-regulating systems. The government
presents the principal goals and monitors their performance ex post facto. The
specific purpose of this system is as follows. First, this system induces the post-
political relationship between government and public enterprises defining each
role clearly. Second, it motivates the managers of public enterprises by evaluating
performance of each corporation yearly. Finally, it clarifies managements’ goals
and makes the enterprises balance entity profitability with public purpose effectively
(Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 29-30).
The Structure and Change of the Performance Measurement System
Since this performance measurement system was implemented in 1984, there
has been no fundamental change of the system. The purpose and basic structure
of the system have been preserved. On the other hand, a variety of changes have
been made with regard to its details, such as the operation of management system,
evaluation organization, performance measurement framework and methods,
enterprises evaluated, and the application of the evaluation results etc.
Performance measures consist of the following three parts by its purpose and
evaluation object: general measures which belong to the general management
sector, goal achievement measures which belong to the goal achievement sector,
and management measures which are in the management sector (Korean Ministry
of Planning and Budget, 2004).
General measures evaluate the comprehensive management achievement and
include capital productivity, managerial efforts for improving responsibility in the
management and in the public benefit, etc. This study classifies the general
measures into lagging measures and leading measures based on each
characteristic.
The performance measurement system leads public enterprises to focus on their
core mission and enhance consistency in management by defining management
direction for each enterprise. Goal achievement measures play a central role in
this field. These measures clearly define the purpose of existence of public
enterprises and contemporary management target (Korean Society of Public
Enterprise 2003 p. 339-340). Therefore, this study considers goal achievement
measures as lagging measures like financial measures in the private sector.
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Management measures which consist of qualitative measures mostly are subdivided
into the organization and human resource management sector, the payments and
employee relation management sector, the internal performance evaluation
management sector, the finance and budgeting management sector, the research
and development sector, and the planning execution and internal process
management sector (Korean Ministry of Planning and Budget 2004). The report
for performance measurement systems in Korean public enterprises emphasizes
that management measures are designed to promote long-term performance
improvement rather than short-term achievement (Korean Society of Public
Enterprise 2003, p. 49). Therefore, this study classifies them as leading measures
like nonfinancial measures in the private sector.
Although each performance measure has been continuously changed, the basic
framework has been maintained. This study follows the established framework
in the system for classification of the measures. This is, as stated above, to prevent
the researcher’s subjectivity caused by reclassification2.
In regard to the evaluation methods, the performance measures are divided into
qualitative measures and quantitative measures. Specifically, quantitative measures
are divided into four types. Government and public enterprises decide targets of
‘Actual to target’ measures based on mutual agreement. ‘Trend’ measures evaluate
the rate of improvement based on the past performance. ‘Beta analysis’ measures
use the weighted average of maximum score and minimum score of the past
performance for the appropriate periods. ‘Targeting’ measures use the difference
between the maximum target and the minimum target. Qualitative measures are
evaluated by a 1-to-5 grading system from 1993 to 1995 and a 1-to-9 grading
system from 1996 onward. The evaluation method of the measures can affect the
results of the study because each method uses different evaluating standards and
formula. Therefore, this study controls how much weight is given to the each
measurement method in relation to the total weight of the dependent variables.
The Composition of the Performance Evaluating Group and Feedback
Procedure
The primary role of the performance-evaluating group is to design performance
measures and evaluate the performance of each enterprise. The group is divided
into three parts: the general evaluating team, the qualitative measure evaluating
team, and the quantitative measure evaluating team. Every year the group consists
of 25 to 40 experts - a professor, CPA, a researcher, and related experts carry
out the performance evaluation on a yearly basis (Korean Society of Public
Enterprise 2003, p. 203). However, there have been discussions and agreements
between the raters and rates in designing the performance measures and in
evaluating management’s performance continuously.
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Incentive payments are decided by the results of the performance evaluation
(from a minimum of 100 percent to a maximum of 300 percent of monthly salary),
and the advice from the results plays an important role as a first guideline for
future management practice. Furthermore, the results of performance evaluation
can also affect public enterprises’ social recognition by officially announcing the
results every year (Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 44).
Hypotheses Development
In spite of the spread of strategic performance measurement systems in the
public sector, there have been very few studies on the efficiency and effectiveness
of performance measurement systems in the public sector. Chu (1993) reveals
that there is no significant relation between qualitative measures and quantitative
measures one or three years later using Korean public enterprises’ data from
1988 to 1991. In a recent study, Na and Lee (2001) investigate the difference
between qualitative measurement and quantitative measurement, the correlation
between weight of the measure and its achievement rate, and the effect of
measurement methods and the number of measures on performance score using
Seoul City-Invested companies’ data. Their results indicate that there is no
significant difference between two measurements and measurement methods
and the number of measures has no effect on the performance score. Na (2003),
applying a structural equation model, tests the causal relationship between
performance measures of Korean public enterprises using government invested-
companies’ data from 1999 to 2000. In that study, each performance measures
are reclassified into result, relation, activity, and future sector based on BSC
framework as well as into qualitative and quantitative measures. He finds that
there is no significant relation between them in both cases.
Prior studies investigating the relation between performance measures in public
enterprises fail to verify the long-term relation between performance measures
because of the limitations of the data period. However, it can take a long time for
leading measures to affect lagging measures (Banker et al. 2000; Said et al.
2003). This study, using 14 years of data set from 1990 to 2003, tests whether a
long-term relation between performance measures exists, and if any, how long
the effect lasts. Furthermore, the prior studies have focused on the relation between
quantitative measures and qualitative measures (Chu 1993; Na 2003). However,
in the public sector, the cause-and-effect relation needs to be designed between
goal achievement measures which evaluate the effort for achieving current mission
and management measures which evaluate current effort for achieving future
mission rather than between quantitative measures and qualitative measures
(Kaplan 2001, p. 361).3 The classification of measures in Korean public enterprises’
performance measurement system (general measures, goal achievement measures
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and management measures) also can be considered to reflect this cause-and-
effect relationship (Korean Ministry of Planning and Budget 2004, p. 37).
Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis.
H1: Management measures are positively significantly associated with goal
achievement measures currently or prospectively.
The management sector is subdivided into the organization and human resource
management sector (ORG), the payments and employee relation management
sector (EMP), the internal performance evaluation management sector (PER),
the finance and budgeting management sector (FIN), the research and development
sector (R&D), the planning execution and internal process management sector
(PRO) (Korean Ministry of Planning and Budget 2004, p. 37).
Rationalization of organization and human resource management, as one of the
cardinal means to implement the strategy of corporations, require firms to achieve
systematic empowerment, simplify and specialize the organizational structure,
and promote employee career management based on ability and performance
(Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 356-359).
Payments and employee relation management is focused on the prevention of
moral hazard such as excessive labor costs and welfare costs derived from reckless
management and introduction of a payment system based on ability and
performance. Moreover, in recent time, they have been improving labor-
management relations by increasing the opportunities of conversations between
management and unions and enlarging the participation of labors (Korean Society
of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 370-372).
The internal performance evaluation management sector promotes organic
relations between the performance measurement system of Korean public
enterprises and internal ones. They evaluate whether the internal performance
measurement system is well established and effectively operated (Korean Society
of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 364-368).
Generally, a financial perspective provides a constraint, not an objective for
government and not-for-profit organizations. These organizations must limit their
spending to budgeted amounts (Kaplan and Norton 1996, p. 180). However, when
more autonomy is given, promoting efficiency of budget management and achieving
sound finance also become important. The finance and budgeting management
sector deals with financial structure improvement and reasonable budgeting
(Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 360-363).
The research and development are primary factor not only in the private sector
but also in the public sector. The performance measurement system of Korean
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public enterprises has evaluated efficiency and effectiveness of the research and
development activity since its inception in 1984 (Korean Society of Public Enterprise
2003, p. 374).
Lastly, the other measures which are included nowhere among the above sectors
are collected in the planning execution and internal process management sectors.
These measures (e.g., managerial efforts for improving responsibility in
management and public benefit, rightness of management planning, administrative
expense and inventory management) can be considered to evaluate efficiency of
process and effectiveness of planning execution.
An aggregated score of management measures is not sufficient to identify which
sectors among them are significantly associated with goal achievement measures.
Therefore, this study posits the following hypothesis.
H2: Specific management measures (ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and PRO)
are positively significantly associated with goal achievement measures currently
or prospectively.4
Estimation Models and Tests
Data
Yearly performance evaluation score data were obtained for a period from 1990
to 2003 (14 years) for 13 Korean public enterprises from public sources. Korean
public enterprises are Korea Electric Power Corporation, Korea Minting and
Security Printing Corporation, Korea Coal Corporation, Korea Resources
Corporation, Korea National Oil Corporation, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion
Agency, Korea Highway Corporation, Korea National Housing Corporation, Korea
Water Resources Corporation, Korea Land Corporation, Korea Agricultural and
Rural Infrastructure Corporation, Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation and
Korea Tourism Organization.5
The performance measurement system has changed as we noted in section II. It
includes the introduction and deletion of performance measures, weights and
evaluation methods changes. The evaluation method of grading for qualitative
measures changed from a five-point scale to a nine-point scale in 1996. The
range of ratings of each measure extended from 75-100 to 0-100 in 1998 (Ahn
and Kim 2005). Therefore, we transformed the data to reflect the above changes.
The rating scores from 1998 to 2003 are transformed to the scale of a minimum
75 maximum 100 using the formula “(original score/4) +0.75”.
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Models
The Relation between LAG and LEAD
To test the hypothesis I, the following model is specified for estimation using
pooled time-series data for 13 enterprises:
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i
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β ε
− −
=
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ +
∑
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(M1)
where:
i : 1,...,13 represents the individual public enterprises,
t : 1,...11 represents the years in our sample period,
1, ~ 1t t
LAG
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the goal achievement sector
divided by total weights of performance measures in the goal
achievement sector of firm i in year t, t-1,
, ~ 3i t t
LEAD
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the management sector
divided by total weights of performance measures in the management
sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-3,
,i t
NUM : The number of goal achievement measures of firm i in year t,
,i t
ROA : Net income divided by total assets of firm i in year t,
,i t
SIZE : The natural log of total assets of firm i in year t,
,i t
RGRA : Total weights of grading measures in the goal achievement sector
divided by total weights of performance measures in the goal
achievement sector of firm i in year t,
,
1
i t
RTAR : Total weights of actual to target measures in the goal achievement
sector divided by total weights of performance measures in the goal
achievement sector of firm i in year t,
,
2
i t
RTAR : Total weights of targeting measures in the goal achievement sector
divided by total weights of performance measures in the goal
achievement sector of firm i in year t,
,i t
RTRE : Total weights of trend measures in the goal achievement sector divided
by total weights of performance measures in the goal achievement
sector of firm i in year t,
i
FIRM : A dummy variable = 1 if firm i = 0 otherwise,
tYEAR : A dummy variable = 1 if year t = 0 otherwise,
,i t
ε : Random error term.
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The above model I specifies the relation between LAG (performance of goal
achievement sector) at t and LEAD (performance of management sector) at t, t-
1, t-2 t-3 controlling for other variables that can affect LAG at t. While earlier
studies recognize that nonfinancial measures may have a long-term impact, there
is no formal theory to identify the specific number of lags for nonfinancial measures
(Banker et al. 2000). Therefore, this study adds the LEAD variable from t to t-3
subsequently to the model for checking whether there exists additional effects of
LEAD variables to LAG controlling future LEAD.6
In testing the relation, this study introduces controls for a number of factors. For
controlling past goal achievement performance, this study includes lagged values
of LAG (Banker et al. 2000; Said et al. 2003). We also include variables to
control for profitability, size, the number of measures and the structure of the
evaluation methods (Grading, Actual to target, Targeting, Trend and Beta analysis).
Profitability is measured using the ROA. Compared to the private sector, the
public sector doesn’t consider profitability as a fundamental target. So we cannot
evaluate the performance of the public sector by just using a profitability index
(Park and Lee 2000). Nevertheless, in our data, a few performance measures in
goal achievement sector reflect profitability (e.g., Capital productivity, Labor
productivity) and profitability of each enterprise serves a guide to the evaluation
of other performance measures (Jang and Lee 1997). Therefore, this paper controls
profitability by using ROA which is defined as net income divided by total assets.
The results of the questionnaire on the attitude of ratees to the performance
measurement system show that even though they think a performance measurement
system is necessary, they are not satisfied with the results. The primary reason of
this phenomenon is that many ratees and even raters are not sure of the fairness
of the performance measurement system (Kwon and Yoon 1999). In this study,
we apply the fixed effects model. So the individual facts of each enterprise are
controlled. However, there still can be a relation between size and performance
of each enterprise. Therefore, we include the natural log value of total assets as
control variable.
The use of multiple measures leads to questions about the value of including a
broad set of metrics in performance measurement systems. A diverse set of
performance measures may cause ratees to spread their efforts over too many
objectives, reducing the effectiveness of the performance measurement system
(Ittner and Larcker 1998b). In addition, a broad set of performance measures
can affect raters by inducing a leniency tendency, so we also control the number
of measures in dependent variable.
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Because the distribution of the score is different depending on the evaluation
method, the structure of the evaluation methods can also affect the score of the
dependent variables. The average score of actual to target measures are very
close to the full score while the grading measures show the lowest score among
the evaluation methods (Jang and Lee 1997). In addition, the standard deviation
of the scores of the qualitative measures is lower than that of the quantitative
measures due to central tendency (Saal et al. 1980; Ahn and Kim 2005).7 To
controlling this effect, we calculated the value that the weights of each method’s
measures in the goal achievement sector divided by total weights of performance
measures in goal achievement sector and put them to the model (RGRA, RTAR1,
RTAR2 and RTRE).8
As we explain in section II, the basic framework of a performance measurement
system have been preserved. However, the concrete factors have changed
continuously. For controlling the change of the raters, the policy of government,
etc. we include year specific dummies in the model.
Finally, 13 enterprises of this study belong to the different industries. In addition,
the characteristics of each firm are unique and very difficult to compare.9 For
controlling this effect, we include firm specific dummies in the model (Banker et
al. 2000; Said et al. 2003).
The Relation between LAG and ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and PRO
To test the hypothesis II, the following model is specified for estimation using
pooled time-series data for 13 enterprises:
, 0 1 , 1 2 , ~ 3 3 , ~ 3 4 , ~ 3 5 , ~ 3
6 , ~ 3 7 , ~ 3 8 , 9 , 10 ,
11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ,
1
1
&
1 2
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i t t i t t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i i
i
LAG LAG ORG EMP PER FIN
R D PRO NUM ROA SIZE
RGRA RTAR RTAR RTRE
FIRM
α β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β
β
− − − − −
− −
=
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+ ⋅
2 10
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1
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t
YEARβ ε
=
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(M2)
where:
i : 1,...,13 represents the individual public enterprises,
t : 1,...11 represents the years in our sample period,
1, ~ 1t t
LAG
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the goal achievement sector
divided by total weights of performance measures in the goal
achievement sector of firm i in year t, t-1,
1, ~ 3t t
ORG
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the organization and human
resource management sector (ORG) divided by total weights of
performance measures in the ORG sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2,
t-3,
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1, ~ 3t t
EMP
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the payments and employee
relation management sector (EMP) divided by total weights of
performance measures in the EMP sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-
3,
1, ~ 3t t
PER
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the internal performance
evaluation management sector(PER) divided by total weights of
performance measures in the PER sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-
3,
1, ~ 3t t
FIN
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the finance and budgeting
management sector (FIN) divided by total weights of performance
measures in the FIN sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-3,
1, ~ 3
&
t t
R D
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the research and
development sector (R&D) divided by total weights of performance
measures in the R&D sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-3,
1, ~ 3t t
PRO
−
: Total scores of performance measures in the planning execution and
internal process management sector (PRO) divided by total weights
of performance measures in the PRO sector of firm i in year t, t-1, t-
2, t-3,
*See model I for definition of other variables
The above model II specifies the relation between LAG (performance of goal
achievement sector)at t and ORG, EMP, PRO, FIN, R&D and PRO (performance
of  specific management sector) at t, t-1, t-2 t-3 controlling for other variables
that can affect LAG at t. As we distinguish management sectors to specific
sectors, we investigate the detailed relation between goal achievement measures
and specific management measures.10 We controlled other variables following
model I.
The Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 13 public enterprises. The average
value of LAG is a little higher than that of LEAD (0.94, 0.91 respectively). The
average values of ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and PRO are from 0.90 to 0.91.
There exists little difference among them because these measures mainly consist
of the qualitative measures. As we said above, raters of qualitative measures
belong to the qualitative measures evaluating team together. The average number
of performance measures in the goal achievement sector is 14.7 units. The weights
of goal achievement sector consists of grading measures by 32.4 percent, actual
to target measures 18.8 percent, targeting measures by 6.2 percent, trend measures
by 38 percent and beta analysis measures by 4.6 percent. Trend measures are
mostly used, because the purpose of the performance measurement system is
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not to evaluate the achievement of each enterprise relatively, but to evaluate the
improvement of them absolutely based on past achievements (Korean Society of
Public Enterprise 2003, p. 43). Table 1 also indicates that there exists a large
difference between TAR1 and GRADE (0.99, 0.91 respectively). Especially, the
fact that TAR1 is close to the full score implies the target is determined by the
level which is easily achievable. The average value of ROA is 0.4 percent. The
standard deviation of ROA is high because the profitability of public enterprises
is largely affected by external contingent factors.
Table 2 provides the matrix of correlations between LAG and explanatory
variables. LAG, LEAD at t are highly correlated with LAG, LEAD at t-1 (??=
0.66 and ??= 0.69, p = 0.0001). ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and PRO are highly
positively correlated with LEAD at t (??= 0.60,???= 0.70,???= 0.54,???= 60,???=
0.52, ??= 0.8811, p = 0.0001). The specific management measures are highly
correlated each other (ORG-EMP: ??= 0.39, ORG-PER: ??= 0.44, ORG-R&D:
Variable Mean Standard First Median Third
Deviation Quartile Quartile
LAG 0.936 0.024 0.920 0.940 0.953
LEAD 0.910 0.032 0.891 0.914 0.935
ORG 0.914 0.038 0.894 0.919 0.938
EMP 0.904 0.049 0.870 0.914 0.944
PER 0.914 0.039 0.887 0.913 0.938
FIN 0.905 0.043 0.877 0.913 0.939
R&D 0.902 0.039 0.875 0.906 0.938
PRO 0.911 0.045 0.885 0.920 0.944
NUM 14.720 2.769 13.000 15.000 17.000
GRADE 0.907 0.029 0.891 0.911 0.928
TAR1 0.989 0.027 0.995 1.000 1.000
TAR2 0.954 0.065 0.932 0.979 1.000
TREND 0.929 0.042 0.903 0.936 0.960
BETA 0.952 0.067 0.939 0.984 1.000
RGRA 0.324 0.090 0.250 0.333 0.389
RTAR1 0.188 0.068 0.175 0.189 0.204
RTAR2 0.062 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.073
RTRE 0.380 0.151 0.298 0.400 0.500
RBET 0.046 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.064
ROA 0.004 0.075 0.001 0.006 0.018
GRADE : Total scores of grading measures divided by total weights from 1993 to 2003,
TAR1 : Total scores of actual to target measures divided by total weights from 1993 to 2003,
TAR2 : Total scores of targeting measures divided by total weights from 1993 to 2003,
TREND : Total scores of trend measures divided by total weights from 1993 to 2003,
BETA : Total scores of beta analysis measures divided by total weights from 1993 to 2003,
*See model I and II for definitions of other variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Public Enterprises
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??= 0.32, ORG-PRO:???= 0.5, EMP-FIN: ??= 0.39, EMP-PRO: ??= 0.43, PER-
R&D: ??= 0.42, PER-PRO: ??= 0.42, R&D-PRO: ??= 0.57, p = 0.0001).
Interestingly, LEAD at t is correlated with LEAD at t-3 higher than LEAD at t-
2.(??= 0.64, ??= 0.61, p = 0.0001). This is contrary to the general fact that
correlations are attenuated as time goes by. Table 3 presents the matrix of
correlations between LAG and control variables. LAG at t is positively correlated
with RGRA (??= 0.28, p = 0.0006) but highly negatively correlated with RTAR1
(??= -0.43, p = 0.0001). Considering that TAR1 (0.99) is 0.08 point higher than
GRA (0.91), this result is contrary to expectations. NUM is negatively correlated
with LAG and LEAD (??= -0.21, p = 0.014). ROA is not significantly correlated
with LAG, but correlated with LEAD (??= 0.11, ??= 0.27 respectively). The
magnitude is not so high. Finally, SIZE is not correlated with LAG, but correlated
with LEAD (??= 0.34, p = 0.0001).
The Relation between Goal Achievement Measures and Management
Measures
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of the relation between goal achievement
measures and management measures by extending time period from t to t-3. The
overall regressions are significant (F = 8.28, p = 0.0001, F = 8.08, p = 0.0001, F =
7.79, p = 0.0001, F = 7.50, p = 0.0001) with adjusted R2 from 0.609 to 0.615.
Panel A of table 4 indicates that LEAD at t are positively associated with LAG at
t. However, this must be interpreted with caution because LAG is also associated
with LEAD currently when we put it in as an independent variable.12 Panels B,
C, and D of table 4 suggest that LEAD from t-1 to t-3 are not significantly
associated with LAG at t. In addition, the coefficients of these variables are
negative. Even though these coefficients are not significant, a negative sign is
contrary to our expectation. The insignificant relationship between the LEAD
from t-1 to t-3 and LAG at t indicates that acquiring high previous LEAD does
not guarantees the high LAG prospectively.
Regarding the control variables in the model I, the coefficients of SIZE are positive
and significant. This indicates that the LAG is higher as the size of enterprises is
larger controlling other variables. Interestingly, RTAR1, RTAR2 and RTRE are
significantly and negatively associated with LAG at t. Specially, Table 4 indicates
that the absolute magnitude of RTAR1 (-0.16) is about 0.1 point larger than RGRA,
RTAR2 and RTRE. This result is contrary to the expectation that the more RTAR1
leads the higher LAG because the TAR1 is very high (0.989). Considering the
correlation coefficient of RTAR1 and LAG at t (-0.43, table 3), result implies that
the less LAG leads the higher RTAR1. NUM are positively associated with LAG
at t. However, the magnitude is small and not significant in Panels B, C, and D. This
indicates that the number of goal achievement measures does not affect LAG at t.
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Variable Expected Sign Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
LAGi,t-1 (+)
0.3319 0.3425 0.3410 0.3444
(4.31)*** (4.42)*** (4.38)*** (4.36)**
LEADi,t (+)
0.1993 0.2237 0.2232 0.2249
(2.24)* (2.44)** (2.43)** (2.43)**
LEADi,t-1 (+)
- -0.0961 -0.0858 -0.0885
(-1.12) (-0.97) (-0.99)
LEADi,t-2 (+)
- - -0.0429 -0.0390
(-0.51) (-0.45)
LEADi,t-3 (+)
- - - -0.0260
(-0.32)
NUMi,t (?)
0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
(1.70)* (1.60) (1.61) (1.62)
ROAi,t (+)
0.0059 0.0060 0.0055 0.0046
(0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.20)
SIZEi,t (+)
0.0117 0.0117 0.0118 0.0117
(2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.96)*** (2.94)***
RGRAi,t (-)
-0.0410 -0.0424 -0.0411 -0.0402
(-1.31) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.26)
RTAR1i,t (+)
-0.1548 -0.1574 -0.1605 -0.1583
(-5.00)*** (-5.08)*** (-5.06)*** (-4.86)***
RTAR2i,t (?)
-0.0567 -0.0576 -0.0567 -0.0551
(-2.04)** (-2.07)** (-2.03)** (-1.93)*
RTREi,t (?)
-0.0459 -0.0470 -0.0459 -0.0452
(-2.05)** (-2.10)** (-2.04)** (-1.99)**
F-Value 8.28 8.08 7.79 7.50
Adj R-Sq 0.6138 0.6146 0.612 0.6088
Table 4: Regression Results for the Relation between Goal Achievement Measures and
Management Measures
, 0 1 , 1 2 , ~ 3 3 , 4 , 5 ,
12
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
1
10
,
1
1 2
i t i t i t t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i i
i
t t i t
t
LAG LAG LEAD NUM ROA SIZE
RGRA RTAR RTAR RTRE FIRM
YEAR
α β β β β β
β β β β β
β ε
− −
=
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ +
∑
∑
1. See model I for definitions of variables.
2. t-statistics in parentheses.
3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
4. Parameter estimates of firm and year specific dummy variables are not reported.
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In summary, the overall results suggest that management measures are not
associated with goal achievement measures prospectively. The results also suggest
the size of enterprises and RTAR1 is significantly associated with LAG at t. This
finding leads us to another question about the performance measurement system.
So we extend the analysis of the effect of the size of enterprises, the number of
measures, the structure of the evaluation methods to other dependent variables
(quantitative measures and qualitative measures) in sensitivity analysis.
The Relation between Goal Achievement Measures and Specific
Management Measures
Table 5 presents the result of the model II. Model II investigates the relation
between goal achievement measures and specific management measures by
extending time period from t-t-3. The overall regressions are still significant with
adjusted R2 from 0.612 to 0.630.
Panel A of Table 5 presents that ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and PRO at t are
not associated with LAG at t. This is contrary to the fact that LEAD at t is
significantly correlated with LAG at t. This is because categorizing the LEAD
variables into the specific variables diminishes the variance of each variable.
Panel B of table 5 indicates some interesting results. The coefficients of EMP,
R&D at t-1 are negative and significant. These results are consistent with the
negative sign of LEAD variable at t-1. Another interpretation can be given for
these intriguing coefficients.13 There are no significant variables in Panels C and
D in Table 5. The insignificant relationship between the ORG, EMP, PER, FIN,
R&D, PRO scores from t to t-3 and LAG scores at t indicates consistent results
with the previous analysis in model I.
The coefficients of control variables in the regression of model II is similar to
those of model I. NUM is not significantly associated with dependent variable at
any panel of model II. In summary, consistent with the results of model I, the
specific management measures are not significantly associated with the goal
achievement measures currently or prospectively.
The Interpretation of Results
Considering the results of model I and model II, we can infer that the high
performance of management sector is not linked to the high performance of the
goal achievement sector currently or prospectively. These results fail to come up
to the expectations of system designers. However, the reason for the results of
the analysis can be interpreted in various ways.
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Variable Expected Sign Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
LAGi,t-1 (+) 0.3269 0.3256 0.3176 0.3371
(4.17)*** (4.18)*** (3.97)*** (3.89)***
ORGi,t (+) 0.0587 0.0583 0.0862 0.0952
(1.16) (1.11) (1.55) (1.64)
ORGi,t-1 (+) - 0.0662 0.0749 0.0852
(1.43) (1.53) (1.65)*
ORGi,t-2 (+) - - 0.0632 0.0608
(1.39) (1.29)
ORGi,t-3 (+) - - - 0.0222
(0.51)
EMPi,t (+) -0.0041 0.0062 0.0017 0.0207
(-0.10) (0.15) (0.04) (0.44)
EMPi,t-1 (+) - -0.0825 -0.0664 -0.0634
(-2.20)** (-1.67)* (-1.55)
EMPi,t-2 (+) - - -0.0110 -0.0121
(-0.29) (-0.31)
EMPi,t-3 (+) - - - 0.0398
(1.04)
PERi,t (+) 0.0659 0.0924 0.0760 0.0764
(1.30) (1.74)* (1.38) (1.33)
PERi,t-1 (+) - 0.0023 0.0027 -0.0001
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
PERi,t-2 (+) - - -0.0384 -0.0389
(-0.83) (-0.79)
PERi,t-3 (+) - - - 0.0003
(0.01)
FINi,t (+) 0.0603 0.0824 0.0799 0.0760
(1.56) (2.02)** (1.90)* (1.71)*
FINi,t-1 (+) - -0.0425 -0.0303 -0.0219
(-1.09) (-0.73) (-0.49)
FINi,t-2 (+) - - -0.0253 -0.0236
(-0.64) (-0.58)
FINi,t-3 (+) - - - -0.0462
(-1.33)
R&Di,t (+) -0.0378 -0.0257 -0.0329 -0.0276
(-0.63) (-0.41) (-0.52) (-0.42)
R&Di,t-1 (+) - -0.1109 -0.1057 -0.1027
(-1.82)* (-1.59) (-1.49)
Table 5: Regression Results for the Relation between Goal Achievement Measures
and Specific Management Measures
 (Cont’d)
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R&Di,t-2 (+)
- - 0.0760 0.0909
(-1.28) (-1.37)
R&Di,t-3 (+)
- - - -0.0091
(-0.15)
PROi,t (+)
0.0910 0.0643 0.0568 0.0572
(1.35) (0.95) (0.82) (0.81)
PROi,t-1 (+)
- 0.0053 0.0050 0.0026
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
PROi,t-2 (+)
- - -0.0844 -0.0921
(-1.31) (-1.39)
PROi,t-3 (+)
- - - -0.0081
(-0.13)
NUMi,t (?)
0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007
(1.13) (0.69) (0.92) (0.88)
ROAi,t (+)
0.0046 -0.0088 -0.0079 -0.0129
(0.20) (-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.52)
SIZEi,t (+)
0.0114 0.0106 0.0102 0.0096
(2.83)*** (2.60)*** (2.39)** (2.20)**
RGRAi,t (-)
-0.0345 -0.0591 -0.0600 -0.0547
(-1.05) (-1.78)* (-1.71)* (-1.49)
RTAR1i,t (+)
-0.1551 -0.1690 -0.1645 -0.1603
(-4.76)*** (-5.18)*** (-4.68)*** (-4.25)***
RTAR2i,t (?)
-0.0471 -0.0513 -0.0589 -0.0600
(-1.63) (-1.80)* (-2.01)** (-1.96)**
RTREi,t (?)
-0.0447 -0.0566 -0.0606 -0.0594
(-1.90)* (-2.41)** (-2.51)** (-2.37)**
F-Value 7.23 6.76 5.92 5.20
Adj R-Sq 0.6124 0.6301 0.6247 0.6148
Table 5 (Cont’d)
, 0 1 , 1 2 , ~ 3 3 , ~ 3 4 , ~ 3 5 , ~ 3
6 , ~ 3 7 , ~ 3 8 , 9 , 10 ,
1
11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ,
1
&
1 2
i t i t i t t i t t i t t i t t
i t t i t t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i i
i
LAG LAG ORG EMP PER FIN
R D PRO NUM ROA SIZE
RGRA RTAR RTAR RTRE FIRM
α β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
− − − − −
− −
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
2
10
,
1
t t i t
t
YEARβ ε
=
+ ⋅ +
∑
∑
1. See model I for definitions of variables.
2. t-statistics in parentheses.
3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test).
4. Parameter estimates of firm and year specific dummy variables are not reported.
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The Lack of the Alliance between Strategy and Performance Measures
Kaplan and Norton stated,
“The objectives and the measures for the Balanced Scorecard are more than
just a somewhat ad hoc collection of financial and nonfinancial performance
measures. They are derived from a top-down process driven by the mission and
strategy of the business unit. The Balanced Scorecard should translate a
business unit’s mission and strategy into tangible objectives and measures.”
(Kaplan and Norton 1996, p. 9-10).
The linkage of the strategy and performance measures must be considered most
importantly when applying strategic performance measurement system to public
sector. Based on this strategic alliance, firm’s strategy can be described by cause-
and-effect chains. However, generally nonprofits have considerable difficulty in
clearly defining their strategy. Nonprofits are built around their mission, which is
hardly measurable, and they serve a multitude of constituencies whose goals and
needs may be quite heterogeneous (Speckbacher 2003). In Kwon and Kim (1998),
Korean public enterprises fail to position the mission and competitive strategy
effectively. Actually, the system has not been implemented as strategic
performance measurement system. Raters and ratees have focused on just the
target of each year not on the long-term strategy of each enterprise. They have
used the system as a short-term planning and monitoring tool by just considering
each year’s circumstance and not the long-term strategy.
In addition, it needs to be remembered that the performance measures in
management sector are applied to all the enterprises identically. Despite the fact
that the strategy and the contingent factors of each enterprise are different (Kwon
and Kim 1998), applying an identical system to all the enterprises can deter strategic
resource allocation. Attempting to be everything for everyone virtually guarantees
organizational ineffectiveness (Kaplan 2001).
Finally, when categorizing the evaluation measures into BSC perspectives, the
measures of customer and learning and growth perspectives are relatively rare
than those of internal process measures (Kwon and Kim 1997; Na 2003).14 The
imbalance of measures is due to the attempts to focus on the enhancement of the
efficiency of the public enterprises. However, the management environment of
public entities has changed rapidly and they need to pursue not only public benefit
but also profitability. So a new prospect from the customer and learning and
growth perspectives is required. The excessive emphasis on the internal process
perspective can lead to the enterprises not focusing on output or outcome but
program execution or initiatives (Kaplan 2001).
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Measurement Errors
There needs to be a focus on the expansion of qualitative evaluation as the
performance measurement system settles down.15 There are good reasons why
qualitative measures have been and will continue to be employed. One is that
they are cost effective because such performance data can be collected through
questionnaire or interview surveys that simultaneously elicit information on
practices. The more fundamental reason, however, is that for certain types of
organization and levels of analysis there may be no viable alternative (Wall et al.
2004). In the case of the public company, the latter one is the primary reason.
From the data of this study, we also find that qualitative measures have tended to
focus on overall performance of each sector (ORG, EMP, PER, FIN, R&D and
PRO), whereas quantitative measures have consisted of more specific indicators.
However, as subjective measures are used widely, the issue of measurement
error is also proposed continuously (Bommer et al. 1995; Wall et al. 2004). Generally,
there are two types of error concerning qualitative measures. First, if qualitative
performance measures contain random error, as a result of remembering figures
incorrectly, guessing, or confusing the accounting period of interest with an earlier
or later one, then the effect will be to attenuate any real underlying relationship
with associated variables of interest [Type II error]. More troublesome is the
possibility of systematic bias creating relationships between practices and
performance that do not really exist [Type I error] (Wall et al. 2004). The possibility
of these kinds of measurement error also remains in the data of this study.
Especially, the fact that the information which is used when raters evaluate
performance is obtained from the ratees enhances the possibility of a type II
error.
Quantitative measures also cannot be free from the measurement error issue.
Many prior studies already pointed out the problems of traditional financial measures
(ex. ROI). Problems with managing for short-term financial objectives arise
because operating managers learn that there is a variety of ways to meet profit
and ROI goals. Profits and ROI targets could still be achieved by working a little
harder in the finance office: exploiting accounting conventions, engaging in financial
entrepreneurship, and reducing discretionary expenditures (Johnson and Kaplan
1987, p. 196-197). However, this study focuses not on the private sector but on
the public sector, so financial measures like ROI need not to be considered seriously.
Nevertheless, there still exists the possibility of intentional intervention of raters
and ratees to quantitative measures. For example, the fact that the average score
of actual to target measures are very close to the full score implies the target is
set by the level which is easily achievable. In addition, the fact that as RTAR1 is
negatively related with LAG means the contingent factors affect the choice of
evaluation method.16 Trend measures can motivate the ratees to manage the
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ideal number. In other words, if the performance of the specific year is bad, the
ratees can make the performance even worse for the purpose of acquiring the
Big Bath effect (Chu 1993; Jang and Lee 1997). The point that there exists no
clear criterion of weights allocation also can be the reason of occurrence of
measurement error.
As a result, when measurement errors come into being, performance measures
are may not reflect the original performance. Therefore, the relationship between
performance measures can be attenuated or even worse.
The Endogeneity Issue
Endogeneity is the major econometric issue in the areas of empirical accounting
research (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Endogeneity is caused whenever a predictor is
also a choice variable that is correlated with the random error in the structural
model. In this study, we control the number of measures in the dependent variable
(the structure of evaluation methods using RGRA, RTAR1, RTAR2, RTRE, the
size of the enterprises, ROA, firm and year specific factors), the endogeneity issue
still remains. Specially, because the management of public enterprises is strongly
affected by government policy and many of them are in monopoly industries, there
have been few studies to investigate the contingent factor which can affect their
performance.17 Further research studying the factors which affect the decision of
performance measures and the result are required in the public sector.
Sensitivity Analysis
The Relation between Qualitative Measures and Quantitative Measures
Prior research that has studied the relation between performance measures in
public enterprises categorized the measures into quantitative and qualitative
measures and tested whether the high performance of qualitative measures is
related to the high performance of quantitative measures currently or prospectively
(Chu 1993; Na 2001). This categorization is based on that lagging measures
mostly consist of the quantitative measures compared to that leading measures
mostly consist of the qualitative measures.
However, Table 1 indicates that 36 percent of goal achievement measures are
qualitative measures. What is more, in management measures, the finance and
budgeting management sector and the internal process management sector mainly
consist of quantitative measures. Therefore, this type of categorization (qualitative
vs. quantitative) can deter reflecting the intention of performance measurement
system’s designers.18 Nevertheless, we present the result of the relation between
quantitative measures and qualitative measures. The model used in sensitivity
analysis is as follows.
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where:
i : 1,...,13 represents the individual public enterprises,
t : 1,...11 represents the years in our sample period,
1, ~ 1t t
QUAN
−
: Total scores of quantitative measures divided by total weights of
quantitative measures of firm i in year t, t-1,
, ~ 3i t t
QUAL
−
: Total scores of qualitative measures divided by total weights of
qualitative measures of firm i in year t, t-1, t-2, t-3,
,i t
QUANNUM : The number of quantitative measures of firm i in year t,
,
1
i t
QRTAR : Total weights of actual to target measures divided by total weights
of quantitative measures of firm i in year t,
,
2
i t
QRTAR : Total weights of targeting measures divided by total weights of
quantitative measures of firm i in year t,
,i t
QTRE : Total weights of trend measures divided by total weights of
quantitative measures of firm i in year t,
*See model I for definition of other variables.
Table 6 provides OLS estimates of the relation between qualitative measures and
quantitative measures by extending time period from t to t-3. The Panel A of table
6 suggests that QUAL at t is not associated with QUAN at t. SIZE and QRTAR1
are still significantly associated with dependent variable (positively and negatively).
But the magnitude of QRTAR1 is relatively small compared to RTAR1. QRTAR2
and QRTRE are not significantly associated with QUAN. This implies the less
LAG leads the higher QRTAR1. QUANNUM, ROA are not related with QUAN
at t. The Panels B, C and D of table 6 indicate that QUAL from t-1 to t-3 are not
significantly associated with QUAN at t.
In summary, the overall results suggest that qualitative measures are not
significantly associated with the quantitative measures currently or prospectively.
These results are consistent with prior studies (Chu 1993; Na 2003).
Further Investigation of the Control Variables
Table 4 and 5 indicates that SIZE is significantly associated with dependent variable
(LAG). Table 6 also shows that SIZE is significantly associated with QUAN. To
investigate the effect of these variables to QUAL, the following model is
additionally tested.19
, 0 1 , 1 2 , ~ 3 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
12 10
,
1 1
1 2
i t i t i t t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i i t t i t
i t
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SIZE QRTAR QRTAR QRTRE
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α β β β β
β β β β
β β ε
− −
= =
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, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
12 10
,
1 1
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i t t i t
i t
QUAL QUAL QUAN QUALNUM ROA SIZE
FIRM YEAR
α β β β β β
β β ε
−
= =
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑  (M4)
Variable Expected Sign Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
QUANi,t-1 (+)
0.2720 0.2742 0.2752 0.2690
(3.05)*** (3.04)*** (3.04)*** (2.94)***
QUALi,t (+)
0.1398 0.1539 0.1628 0.1547
(1.03) (1.01) (1.05) (0.99)
QUALi,t-1 (+)
- -0.0302 -0.0545 -0.0330
(-0.21) (-0.34) (-0.20)
QUALi,t-2 (+)
- - 0.0459 0.0020
(0.32) (0.01)
QUALi,t-3 (+)
- - - 0.0849
(0.64)
QUANNUMi,t, (?)
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012
(1.54) (1.52) (1.48) (1.42)
ROAi,t (+)
0.0405 0.0405 0.0420 0.0415
(1.36) (1.35) (1.38) (1.36)
SIZEi,t (+)
0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0106
(2.08)** (2.07)** (2.07)** (2.04)**
QRTAR1i,t (+)
-0.0564 -0.0565 -0.0538 -0.0570
(-1.84)* (-1.84)* (-1.68)* (-1.76)*
QRTAR2i,t (?)
-0.0285 -0.0285 -0.0288 -0.0317
(-1.03) (-1.02) (-1.03) (-1.11)
QRTREi,t (?)
-0.0228 -0.0229 -0.0233 -0.0242
(-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-1.00)
F-Value 9.63 9.24 8.88 8.58
Adj R-Sq 0.6457 0.6426 0.6397 0.6378
Table 6: Regression Results for the Relation between Qualitative Measures and
Quantitative Measures
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1. See model III for definitions of variables.
2. t-statistics in parentheses.
3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
4. Parameter estimates of firm and year specific dummy variables are not reported.
where:
,i t
QUALNUM : The number of qualitative measures of firm i in year t,
*See model I for definition of other variables.
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SIZE variable is consistently associated with dependent variable in model I, model
II and model III. Table 7 shows that SIZE is not significantly related with QUAL
after controlling other variables. This indicates that the size of enterprises does
not affect the score of qualitative measures. Considering that the score of
qualitative measures is more affected by rater’s subjectivity than quantitative
measures, we can infer that performance evaluation is robust to the size of
enterprises.
NUM and QUANNUM are not significantly correlated with each dependent
variable. In contrary, Table 7 shows that QUALNUM is positively significantly
related with QUAL. This indicates that performance of qualitative measures is
affected by the number of measures. Both raters and ratees can be affected by
the number of measures. However, the fact that QUANNUM is not significant
but QUALNUM suggests the possibility that raters rather than ratees are more
affected by the number of measures.
Variables Expected Sign Estimate
QUALi,t-1 (+) 0.4339
(5.43)***
QUANi,t (+) 0.0774
(1.38)
QUALNUMi,t (?) 0.0016
(1.82)*
ROAi,t (+) 0.0203
(1.08)
SIZEi,t (+) -0.0033
(-1.01)
F-Value 23.24
Adj R-Sq 0.8087
Table 7: Regression Results for the Qualitative Measures as Dependent Variable
1. See model IV for definitions of variables.
2. t-statistics in parentheses.
3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test).
4. Parameter estimates of firm and year specific dummy variables are not reported.
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One of the continuing questions about performance measurement systems is
why they do not fully reflect the different characteristics of each enterprise. To
analyze this criticism, prior studies tested whether difference in firm characteristics
affects evaluation results or not (Kwon and Yoon 1999). This study investigated
whether the characteristics of industry affect the relation between the performance
measures by dividing industry into service and manufacturing area.20 Each result
is consistent with the main test and there is no significant difference between
them (Not reported).
In the early times of the performance evaluation (Y1984), the weights of
quantitative measures were 60 to 70, those of qualitative measures were 30 to
40. In contrast, in the present (Y2002), the weights of quantitative measures are
37 to 39, those of qualitative measures are 61 to 63 (Korean Society of Public
Enterprise 2003, p. 123-131). In addition, they have emphasized the importance
of the linkage between strategy and performance measures recently. Therefore,
we divided the sample into two periods (Y1990-Y1997 and Y1998-Y2003) and
applied the same models. Each result is consistent with the main test and there is
no significant difference between them (Not reported).
Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between performance
measures, by analyzing data from 13 Korean public enterprises. The empirical
results indicate that management measures are not significantly associated with
goal achievement measures prospectively. Furthermore, specific management
measures are not significantly associated with goal achievement measures
currently or prospectively. The research also finds that qualitative measures are
not significantly related with quantitative measures currently or prospectively.
This is consistent with the results of prior studies (Chu 1993; Na 2003).
The structure of the evaluation methods, the number of measures, ROA and the
size of enterprise are controlled in this study. Among them, RTAR1, SIZE are
significantly associated with LAG (negatively, positively in each). Similarly,
QRTAR1, SIZE are related with QUAN (negatively, positively in each). But
SIZE is not correlated with QUAL. As to the number of measures, NUM,
QUANNUM are not associated with dependent variables while QUALNUM is
related with QUAL. Overall results acquired using the fixed effect models, which
control firm and year specific dummies, suggest that performance measurement
systems have not been implemented effectively and have not fulfilled the system
designers’ original intention.
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There are several limitations to this study. First, the possibility of measurement
error remains in the data. Especially, the fact that the information which is used
when raters evaluate the performance is obtained from the ratees enhance the
possibility of type II errors. In addition, because raters do not belong to the
enterprise, it is difficult to expect an in-depth evaluation. Second, even though we
control various variables which can affect the dependent variables, the endogeneity
issue still remains. Specially, the fact that the management of public enterprises is
strongly affected by government policy and many of them are in monopoly
industries might impair the robustness of this study.
This study provides fruitful results for testing the effectiveness and the
characteristics of performance measurement systems using long-term data. It
also suggests a new approach following the structure of an existing performance
measurement system. The results of this paper were achieved by applying various
models to data from public sector will be useful information set for future research.
Notes
1 The drivers, encompassing customer, internal-business-process and learning and growth
perspective, are derived from a translation of the organization’s strategy into tangible objectives
and measures (Kaplan and Norton 1996, p.18).
2 Management efficiency sector (ex. inventory management) belongs to goal achievement sector
in some years and in the management sector for other years. Because the performance measures
of this sector reflect the efficiency of finance or internal process, this study classifies those
into FIN or PRO.
3 This study includes additional analysis about the relation between quantitative measures and
qualitative measures in sensitivity analysis. There is no statistically significant relation between
them.
4 Many studies apply the structural equation model and the simultaneous equation model to
investigate the relation between independent variables and dependent variables simultaneously
(Bryant et al. 2004; Huh and Park., 2004). However, because the endogeneity issue has not
been properly studied, this paper prefers not to apply this method. Model specification issue
is a realively young area of managerial accounting (Ittner and Larker. 2001).
5 These corporations affect the economy of the private sector directly or indirectly because
they are part of the national infrastructure. (Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p.
520).
6 Banker et al. (2000) use Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag length for
nonfinancial measures. However, in order to mitigate the severe multicollinearity problem,
they use the moving average of the past six lags of the nonfinancial measures as independent
variables. The results of this study suggest that there exists no significant relation between
LAG and LEAD. So we report the results of the test from t-3 to t instead of applying AIC.
The multicollinearity problem is not a factor as the variance inflation factors are less than 10.
7 Table 1 shows that TAR1(total scores of actual to target measures divided by total weights
from 1993 to 2003) is 0.99, while GRADE(total scores of grading measures divided by total
weights from 1993 to 2003) is 0.91. TAR1 is very close to the full score. In contrast, GRA
shows the lowest score among the evaluation methods.
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8 If we additionally control the RBET (Total weights of beta analysis measures divided by total
weights of performance measures in goal achievement sector of firm i in year t), there arise an
extreme mullticollinearity problem. So we exclude this variable in the model. Table 1 indicates
that RBET is the lowest (0.046) among the evaluation methods.
9 The scores of some enterprises are higher than other enterprises annually.
1 0 When we distinguish management measures into specific sectors, we guess the scores of each
sector tend to be highly correlated. However, the results of the regression analyses show no
evidence of multicollinearity as the variance inflation factors are less than 10.
1 1 PRO is very highly correlated with LEAD (r = 0.88). This is because this sector consists of
various measures which do not belong to other sectors.
1 2 This result is due to the fact that the grading measures consisting of LAG variable is highly
correlated with management measures. When we apply transformed LAG variable which is
calculated without the grading measures in the Model, that is not significantly associated with
LEAD at t.
1 3 This study doesn’t focus on the change of the coefficient sign. So if this phenomenon is
meaningful, another study is required. One possible interpretation is the smoothing effect
induced by raters.
1 4 In Na (2003)’s study, he reclassified the performance measures of Seoul City-invested
corporations based on BSC perspectives. Result shows the number of internal process
perspective measures is 80 percent of all. In contrary, those of customer, learning and growth
perspective measures are just 5 percent respectively.
1 5 In the early years of performance evaluation (1984), the weights of quantitative measures
were 60 to 70, those of qualitative measures are 30 to 40. In contrast, at the present time, the
weights of quantitative measures are 37 to 39, those of qualitative measures are 61 to 63
(Korean Society of Public Enterprise 2003, p. 123-131).
1 6 Performance evaluation measures have to be applied differently depending on the characteristics
of each corporation.
1 7 In the private sector, many studies have investigated a variety of information and control
system attributes. This set of studies generally supports the theories that the choice of
performance measures is a function of the organization’s competitive environment, strategy,
and organizational design, but the performance effects of these choices remains uncertain
(Ittner and Larcker 2001; Said et al. 2003)
1 8 In Na (2003)’s research, he reclassified the performance measures based on BSC perspectives.
In this study, as we said section II, we follow the structure of the performance measurement
system as it is to reflect the intention of designers and implementers.
1 9 This analysis also can be performed when the dependent variable is LEAD. However, because
management measures are mostly evaluated by using grading method (78.8%), similar results
are obtained with the case when the dependent variable is QUAL.
2 0 Service enterprises: Korea Electric Power Corporation, Korea Minting and Security Printing
Corporation, Korea Coal Corporation, Korea Highway Corporation, Korea National Housing
Corporation, Korea Water Resources Corporation, Korea Land Corporation, and Korea
Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Corporation. Manufacturing enterprises: Korea Resources
Corporation, Korea National Oil Corporation, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency,
and Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation and Korea Tourism Organization (Korean
Ministry of Planning and Budget, 2004).
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